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Abstract
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are one of the engines of economic activity that could make a positive contribution to the national economy. SOEs has
a strategic role in development, certain business sectors and as implementers of public services. The role of SOEs is manifested in the form of a business
entity that is profit-oriented and public services so that it requires serious and professional guidance, management, and supervision by the government
through the Ministry of SOEs. According to Law No. 19 of 2003, the guidance and management of SOEs is no longer based on the APBN system,
but based on the good corporate governance. Explicitly, this norm encourages the government through the Ministry of SOEs to act more professionally
which can improve competitiveness in the development and management of SOEs. This article is to examine on how Ministry of SOEs role can be
improved so the Ministry could be more independent to guide, manage, and supervise SOEs.
Keywords: soes; guidance; management; supervision; good corporate governance
Abstrak
Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN) merupakan salah satu mesin penggerak kegiatan ekonomi yang dapat memberikan
kontribusi positif terhadap perekonomian nasional. BUMN memiliki peran strategis dalam pembangunan, sektor-sektor usaha
tertentu dan sebagai pelaksana pelayanan publik. Peran BUMN diwujudkan dalam bentuk korporasi badan usaha yang profit
oriented dan public services, sehingga memerlukan pembinaan, pengelolaan dan pengawasan yang serius serta profesional oleh
pemerintah melalui Kementerian BUMN. Berdasarkan Undang-Undang No. 19 Tahun 2003, pembinaan dan pengelolaan
BUMN tidak lagi didasarkan pada sistem Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara (APBN), namun didasarkan pada prinsip-prinsip
perusahaan yang sehat. Secara eksplisit, norma tersebut mendorong pemerintah melalui Kementerian BUMN untuk lebih
bertindak profesional yang mampu meningkatkan daya saing dalam pembinaan dan pengelolaan BUMN. ini mengkaji gagasan
bagaimana seharusnya peran Kementerian BUMN dapat ditingkatkan, sehingga Kementerian BUMN lebih independen dalam
pembinaan, pengelolaan serta pengawasan BUMN.
Kata kunci: bumn; pembinaan; pengelolaan; pengawasan; good corporate governance

I. INTRODUCTION
SOEs was established to achieve the purpose as a public service while at the same time
making a profit. With this purpose, many argue that SOEs can be unable to compete with private
companies or firms that only focus on looking for profits.2 Moreover, there is a stigma that
SOEs will act less aggressively in seeking profits compared to its competitors due to their low
level of efficiency.3 To increase the efficiency of SOEs, further government strategies and
policies are needed.
Over the past four decades, most of the policy and regulatory interventions of SOEs in
many countries have focused on policies in the form of liberalization and privatization.4 In
Indonesia, the Government continues to strive to effectively manage SOEs. From the end of
the New Order government, the government has realized the importance of formulating a
strategy to unleash the potential of SOEs that have been known as inefficient companies,
mismanagement, and become intermediaries for political groups and individuals.5 According to
experts in the field of SOEs from the Inter-American Development Bank,in general there are at least
1 (alumni) of Master of Law Program ,, Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia. Obtained Bachelor of
Law, (S.H) from Diponegoro University (2016).
2 David E.M. Sappington and J. Gregory Sidak, “Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises”,
Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 71, No. 2, (2003), pg. 479.
3 Emita W. Astami, Greg Tower, Rusmin Rusmin dan John Neilson, “The Effect of Privatisation on
Performance of State-Owned-Enterprises in Indonesia”, Asian Review of Accounting, Vol. 18 No. 1, (2010), pg. 7.
4 Mikko Rajavuori, “State Ownership and the United Nations Business and Human Rights Agenda: Three
Instruments, Three Narratives”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, (2016), pg. 667 – 668.
5 Agung Wicaksono, “Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises: The Challenge of Reform”, Southeast Asian
Affairs, (2008), pg. 146.

DHARMASISYA Vol. I N0. 4 (Deseember 2021)

2027

DHARMASISYA

Jurnal Program Magister Hukum Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia
Volume 1 Nomor 4 (Desember 2021) 2027-2048
e-ISSN: 2808-9456

4 reasons why the management of SOEs becomes inefficient, namely: i) politics, ii) finance, iii)
managerial, and iv) regulation6.
Since the reformation era in Indonesia or the enactment of Law No. 19 of 2003 on
SOEs (“Law No. 19/2003”), SOE reform has provided space and created more competitive
conditions in the business world as well as the development of private companies. For private
companies, maximizing profits is considered the main goal, while for SOEs profit is only one
of the few goals and often not the most important.7 Law No. 19/2003 essentially puts SOEs in
the national economic system as an extension of the state's hand to perform social functions,
namely providing services in the form of goods and/or services for the greatest prosperity of
the people (public services) while seeking profit (profit oriented).8 The purpose of public services is
that the state provides a service to the community related to the price and/or location that can
be accessed by all citizens.9 SOEs has its own challenges in carrying out its roles.
In the government of President Joko Widodo, SOEs have become the center of the
economic agenda that continues to be developed.10 The development of SOEs aims to build
infrastructure, industrialization, boost regional economies, and resource sovereignty, which is
considered to have slowed or weakened over the past two decades.11 Such reforms and support
have improved the efficiency and competitiveness of SOEs leading to substantial growth. Such
reforms have so far created a new generation of SOEs with diverse types of ownership and a
significant level of internationalization.
Along with increasing of economic dynamics, the strategic role and function of profit
oriented SOEs and public services become very significant. The high level of business competition
between corporate business entities, especially competition with private business entities,
demands SOEs to be more productive and more competitive in carrying out their business
activities. Although undeniable, SOEs have a special status and characteristics that distinguish
them from private companies where there is an element of state ownership in them.12 Apart
from this, SOEs are also required to build a culture of business-oriented corporate business
entities and development with a total of professionals.
In order to realize a total professional SOE, it is inseparable from the improvement,
developing, and management carried out by the Ministry of SOEs. Therefore, the Ministry of
SOEs is required to act completely professional in developing and managing SOEs. In other
words, the total professional attitude does not only cover the organs of directors and
commissioners of SOEs but also covers the Ministry of SOEs in carrying out coaching and
management as shareholders as well as an extension of the state in SOEs. This is actually in line
with the norms stipulated in Law No. 19/2003, namely the development and management of
SOEs no longer based on the APBN system, but based on the good corporate governance. 13
6 Enrique Moreno de Acevedo Sánchez, “State-owned Enterprise Management”, Inter-American
Development Bank, (June, 2016), pg. 8.
7 Ravi Ramamurti. “Performance Evaluation of State-Owned Enterprises in Theory and Practice”,
Management Science, Vol. 33, No. 7 (July, 1987), pg. 887.
8 Madaskolay Viktoris Dahoklory, “Dinamika Pengelolaan Keuangan BUMN perihal “Dilema” antara
Kerugian Negara ataukah Kerugian Bisnis”, Jurnal Rechtsvinding, Vol. 9, No. 3, (Desember, 2020), pg. 350-351.
9 Ines Willemyns, “Disciplines on State-Owned Enterprises in International Economic Law: Are We
Moving in the Right Direction?”, Journal of International Economic Law Oxford, (2016), pg. 660.
10 Eve Warburton, “A New Developmentalism in Indonesia?”, Journal of Southeast Asian Economies, Vol.
35, No. 3, (2018), pg. 360.
11 Kyunghoon Kim, “Using Partially State-Owned Enterprises for Development in Indonesia”, Asian
Pacific Business Review, VOL. 25, NO. 3, (2019), pg. 318.
12 I Made Asu Dana Yoga Arta, “Status Kepemilikan Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN) Persero setelah
Dikuasai oleh Pihak Swasta”, Jurnal IUS, Vol. V, No. 2, (August, 2017), pg. 182.
13 Indonesia, Law on State-Owned Enterprises, Law No. 19 of 2003. Elucidation Art 4 par (1)
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Centralization of SOEs under the Ministry of SOEs aims to improve the performance of SOEs,
eliminate bureaucracy, and accelerate the required privatization process.14
However, in carrying out these duties, the Ministry of SOEs is inseparable from the
responsibility of the Ministry of Finance in administering government affairs in the field of state
finance. Several forms of responsibility that are still carried out by the Ministry of Finance
towards SOEs are: (1) administration of state equity participation and all its changing structures;
(2) proposal for the participation of state capital to SOEs; dan (3) establishment of SOEs.15
Realized or not, this condition affects the development and management of SOEs by
the Ministry of SOEs. As for SOEs themselves, such conditions can cause difficulties in practice
and distortions in understanding the subjugate of the law. This makes SOEs less dynamic and
difficult to compete than similar private business entities. For example, a state-owned enterprise
engaged in banking, must submit not only to the SOE Law, the Limited Liability Company Law,
and the Banking Law, but also to the State Finance Law, the State Treasury Law and the
Corruption Crimes Act. The conditions may be different if the development, management, and
even supervision of SOEs are entirely carried out by the Ministry of SOEs independently
without the involvement of the Ministry of Finance. Of course it is not easy to reconstruct such
conditions, because it requires a comprehensive understanding, not just commercial calculations
and regulatory changes.
Taking into account these conditions, this paper is a critical study in the context of the
idea of developing, management and supervision of SOEs directly carried out by the Ministry
of SOEs without having to involve the Ministry of Finance. Some of the things that will be
discussed are: first, the journey of developing and managing of SOEs that was initially carried
out by the Ministry of Finance and then handed over to the Ministry of SOEs. Second, how is
the main function and duties of the Ministry of Finance as the state treasurer in the
administration of state wealth, including in this case the state wealth that is separated as
stipulated in the APBN. Third, how it should improve the role of the Ministry of SOEs in the
development, management and even supervision of SOEs. In this section will be seen the legal
implications critically, especially to the role and function of the Ministry of SOEs and the
Ministry of Finance. Hopefully, the improving role and function of the Ministry of SOEs does
not reduce the true meaning in the management of state assets.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Development and Management of SOEs
SOEs established in Indonesia to fulfill pragmatic needs.16 Philosophically, SOEs was
born due to the state's obligation to prosper its people as stipulated in Article 33 of the 1945
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.17 The concept of the creation of SOEs because the
state is not possible to carry out business activities directly, so SOEs becomes a forum for the
state to provide welfare to its people through the placement of state capital.18 Since the
14 Iman Harymawan, et.al, “How does the presidential election period affect the performance of the stateowned enterprise in Indonesia?”, Cogent Business & Management, (2020), pg. 3.
15 Indonesia, Government Regulation on The Transfer of Position, Duties and Authority of the Minister of Finance in
The Company (Persero), Public Companies (Perum) And Office Companies (Perjan) to the Minister of State Business Entities, GR
No. 64 Tahun 2001, Art. 2 par. (1).
16 Hassan Kartadjoemena, “State Enterprises in Indonesia: Present Issues and Future Prospects”, Southeast
Asian Affairs, (1976), pg. 202.
17 Muhammad Insa Ansari, “The Role of the State-Owned Enterprises on Maritime Development”, Jurnal
Rechtsvinding, Vol. 8, No. 2, (August, 2019), pg. 186.
18 Muchayat, Badan Usaha Milik Negara: Retorika, Dinamika dan Realita (Menuju BUMN yang Berdaya Saing),
(Jakarta: Gagas Bisnis, 2010), pg. 132-133.
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beginning of Indonesia's independence until now, SOEs have played a strategic role in economic
and political development.19 The role of SOEs in economic and political development is in line
with Article 33 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia which states
that production branches which are important to the state and which control the lives of many
people are controlled by the state.20
As the main support for the national economy in Indonesia, SOEs has an important
role. SOEs are built to contribute to the development of the national economy as a whole.21
This is proven by the total assets of SOEs as of December 31, 2019, amounting to IDR 8,739
trillion, an increase of 7.3% from the previous year.22
The development of SOEs in Indonesia occurred in 1956-1958 when there was a
massive nationalization of foreign companies. At that time SOEs was known as a State
Company (Perusahaan Negara/PN).23 PN has a long history of hundreds of years, even thousands
of years ago.24 Along with the development of the era all PN is adapted to its function and
organized into PERJAN, PERUM and PERSERO.25 In the period 1973-1993, the unit that
handles the development of SOEs was in echelon II-level units, known as the Directorate of
Persero and State Company Financial Management (Pengelolaan Keuangan Perusahaan
Negara/PKPN). Furthermore, in the period 1993 to 1998, the organization that was originally
only at the level of Directorate/Echelon II, was upgraded to the equivalent of the Directorate
General/Echelon I, with the name of the Directorate General of Development of State
Business Entities (DJ-PBUN). In 1998, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia changed
the form of the organization of trustees and managers of SOEs to the level of the Ministry, with
the name of the Ministry of State Utilization of SOEs. In connection with the establishment of
ministries and in order to improve the performance and efficiency of SOEs, the Minister of
Finance transferred the position, duties and authority of the Minister of Finance as a shareholder
at Persero Company to the Ministry of SOEs utilization through Government Regulation No.
50 of 1998.26 The ministry took over the supervision of SOEs from 17 sectoral ministries.27 In
2000, although the function of the Ministry of SOEs was abolished and returned to the Ministry
Astami, Greg Tower, Rusmin Rusmin dan John Neilson, “The Effect of Privatisation on Performance
of State-Owned-Enterprises in Indonesia”, pg. 7.
20 Indonesia, the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Art. 33 par (2).
21 Bachtiar H. Simamora, Hartiwi Prabowo dan Rudi, “Success Level Implementation of ERP at Indonesia
State- Owned Enterprises Transportation Sectors”, Journal of Physics: Conf. Series 1175, (2019), pf. 1.
22 Kementerian BUMN, “Kinerja Keuangan BUMN”, https://bumn.go.id/investor/finance, accessed on
February 9, 2021.
23 Andjar Pachta W, “Peranan Badan-Badan Usaha Negara di Indonesia”, Jurnal Hukum Pembangunan,
(1983), pg. 418.
24 K.A. Wittgopel, Orielllai Despotism in Government and Public Enterprise Essay in Honor of Professor V. V.
Ranadham dalam Kurnia Toha, “Masa Depan Monopoli Badan Usaha Milik Negara di Indonesia”, Jurnal Hukum
dan Pembangunan, No. 2, Tahun Ke-34, (April – June, 2004), pg. 110.
25 Indonesia, Law on the Establishment of Government Regulation In lieu of Law No. 1 of 1969 on State
Business Forms Into Law, Law No. 9 of 1969.
26 “Transfer of duties, the authority of the Minister of Finance who represents the government as the
General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS) in Persero is transferred to the State Minister for Utilization of StateOwned Enterprises, however the transfer of duties and authority does not include the activities of administering
any state capital and its changes to PERSERO, a Limited Liability Company. others and investments made by
PERSERO, are still carried out by the Minister of Finance”. Article 1 and Article 2 Government Regulation No.
50 of 1998 concerning Transfer of Position, Duties and Authority of the Minister of Finance as Shareholders or General Meeting
of Shareholders (GMS) in the Company to the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises Utilization of State-Owned Enterprises (GR
No. 50 of 1998).
27 Shidarta dan Van Huis, “Between Revenues and Public Services Delivery,” Bijdragen Tot De Taal-,
Land-En Vonkenkunde, Vol 176, No 2/3, 2020, pg. 317.
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of Finance. Then in 2001, the SOEs supervisory organization returned to its function at the
level of the Ministry and until now it is known as the Ministry of SOEs.28
In the history of the Indonesian economy, SOEs have undergone several
restructurings.29 In 2020, the Ministry of SOEs launched a restructuring program aimed at
partially privatizing.30 This is because, at that time there was a belief that one of the important
steps to improve the competitiveness of the company is to reduce state intervention in the
economy, which in the context of ownership of SOEs is indicated by privatization.31 The
purpose of the restructuring is to create a competitive SOEs.
According to some experts, compared to countries with a centralized SOE ownership
model, Indonesia has a unique structure because there is a stand-alone ministry responsible for
the management of SOEs.32 A more common type of centralized SOE ownership arrangement
is ownership under departments or agencies within ministries or under corporate structures with
separate legal identities.33 Based on the World Bank's categorization of 16 countries with
centralized ownership arrangements, Indonesia is the only country with a ministry-level
ownership structure.34
In principle, the government has its own reasons for establishing SOEs, including the
framework of development, management and supervision of SOEs. In general, the purpose of
the establishment of SOEs is to: (i) support national strategic interests; ii) ensure sustainable
ownership of national companies; (iii) supplying certain public goods or services; (iv) conducting
business activities in a "natural" monopoly situation; and (v) create or maintain state-owned
monopolies (or oligopoly) where market regulation is deemed unfit or inefficient.35 For example
in Germany, the most important production equipment is owned by the state. National property
is not subject to private individual ownership and is exclusively in government hands.36 In
addition to the above objectives, the Government also uses SOEs to encourage regional
development, reduce unemployment, defend from foreign ownership, overcome inflation,
accumulate foreign currencies, save declining industries and encourage high-risk and/or hightech industries.37 SOEs are used to develop certain capabilities, technologies, and knowledge of
a country, without being limited by commercial considerations.38
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), SOEs
make a considerable contribution to gross domestic product (GDP), employment, and market

Sejarah Kementerian BUMN, https://bumn.go.id/about/profile, aceesed on 20 January 2020.
Indah Fitriani, “Pola Pengelolaan Badan Usaha Milik Negara: Sebuah Potret Singkat”, Manajerial, Vol.
10, No. 19, (July, 2011), pg. 54.
30 Shidarta, “Between Revenues and Public Services Delivery”, pg. 319.
31 Maya Sari, et. al., “The Influence of Organization’s Culture and Internal Control to Corporate
Governance and is Impact on Bumn (State-Owned Enterprises) Corporate Performance in Indonesia”, Journal of
Advanced Research in Law and Economics, Volume IX, Spring, 2(32), (2018), pg. 681.
32 Kyunghoon Kim, “Matchmaking: Establishment of State-Owned Holding Companies in Indonesia”,
Wiley Asia & Pacific Policy Studies, (2018), pg. 318.
33 Ibid.
34 World Bank, Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Toolkit, (Washington, DC: World Bank,
2014), pg. 82.
35 OECD (2018), Ownership and Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Compendium of National
Practices.
36 Stephan Supranowitz, “The Law of State-Owned Enterprises in a Socialist State”, Law and Contemporary
Problems, Vol. 26, No. 4, (1961), pg. 794.
37 Arie Y. Lewin, “Research on State-Owned Enterprises: Introduction”, Management Science, Vol. 27, No.
11 (November, 1981), pg. 1324.
38 Willemyns, “Disciplines on State-Owned Enterprises in International Economic Law”, pg. 660.
28
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capitalization of developing countries.39 In many cases, SOEs are the dominant actors, or even
occupy "natural" monopoly positions in their respective fields.40 Therefore, SOEs are expected
to develop the country's economy by increasing state revenues, conducting profit fertilization,
becoming pioneers in terms of business activities that cannot be implemented by the private
sector and cooperatives and support the implementation of government programs in the field
of economy and development.41
The economic sector is a very important sector in a country and intersects with all
aspects of people's lives. The role of SOEs is manifested in business activities in almost all
economic sectors, such as agriculture, fisheries, plantations, forestry, manufacturing, mining,
finance, post and telecommunications, transportation, electricity, industry and trade and
construction. Good performance and synergy is needed between the Ministry of Finance as the
State treasurer and the Ministry of SOEs as the supervisor, manager and supervisor of the SOEs
itself. SOE management is expected to be carried out independently and professionally by the
Ministry of SOEs so that it can achieve the goals of establishing SOEs and further realizing a
totally professional SOEs.
B. Administration of Finance and State Assets in SOEs
In principle, SOEs is a business entity that is wholly or most of the capital owned by
the state through direct participation originating from separated state assets.42 The idea of
reform or privatization of SOEs is to reduce the financial burden and increase the development
of SOEs themselves.43 This gives autonomy and delegation of the use of state assets separated
into SOEs. The legal consequence is separation between owner and manager or ownership and
control.
The separation between the owner (state) and manager (corporation) in SOEs can cause
problems due to weak guidance, administration and supervision as well as lack of
professionalism, both in terms of corporate organs and shareholders. This is one thing why the
role of the Ministry of SOEs is very significant and central in the development, management
and supervision of SOEs. This has the potential to be a recurring problem despite changes in
the scope of government and SOE relations. Even in a country like China, the relationship
between government and SOEs after 30 years in the last round of SOE reform, increasing
corporate independence is still the main goal of policy makers.44
The classic view of SOEs usually revolves around the dimensions of efficiency,
productivity and administrative bureaucracy.45 SOEs are often seen as less efficient entities and
burden the country's economy or even as political protection, therefore a significant study of
how best to reform, privatize or even eliminate such entities is required.46
39

OECD, Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), pg.

11.

Dirk Meissner, David Sarpongb dan Nicholas S. Vonortas, “Introduction to the Special Issue on
Innovation in State Owned Enterprises: Implications for Technology Management and Industrial Development”,
Industry and Innovation, Vol. 26, No. 2, (Desember, 2018), pg. 111.
41 Marie Muhammad, Astar Siregar, Kertas Kerja Kongres ISEI ke-9, Cipanas 27-30 Juli 1983.
42 Indonesia, Undang-Undang Badan Usaha Milik Negara, UU No. 19 Tahun 2003, [*].
43 A. Zen Umar Purba, “Privatization in Indonesia: Restructuration and Public Offering”, Jurnal Hukum
dan Pembangunan, No. 2, Tahun Ke-27, (April, 1997), pg. 92.
44 Ligang Song, “State-Owned Enterprise Reform in China: Past, Present and Prospects,” dalam China’s
40 Years of Reform and Development, ed. Ross Garnaut, Ligang Song and Cai Fang (ANU Press, 2018), pg. 348.
45 Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, et. al., “Governments as Owners: State-Owned Multinational Companies”,
Journal of International Business Studies, 45, (2014), pg. 920.
46 Phillipe Benoit, “State-Owned Enterprises: No Climate Success Without Them”, Journal of
International Affairs Editorial Board, hlm 135, 2019.
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Each country has a strategy to improve the performance of SOEs. The performance of
SOEs in neighboring countries such as Singapore and Malaysia continues to grow with the
establishment of stated-owned holdings. Then the reform of SOEs in China which is one of the
most important things about China's transition to a market economy.47 China has a strategy of
privatization to strengthen state-owned enterprises in their country.48 Later in Sweden, the
Swedish Parliament established one state holding company, Statsföretag, which would be
responsible for most SOEs.49 However, it should be noted that these countries reform the
management of SOEs first before carrying out structural reforms. Institutional and regulatory
foundations have been prepared to support the mechanism of independent SOE strategy with
good supervision.50
Discussing the use of state assets that are separated in state-owned enterprises, will not
be separated from the debate of the scope of state finances on some legislation. Law No. 17 of
2003 on State Wealth (“Law No. 17/2003”) defines state wealth as all rights and obligations of
the state that can be assessed with money, as well as everything either in the form of money or
in the form of goods that can be made state property in connection with the exercise of such
rights and obligations. The definition of state wealth in Law No. 17/2003 uses a broad or
comprehensive definition intended to secure state wealth sourced from people's money.51
The broad definition of state wealth can be seen in Article 2 of Law No. 17/2003 which
expands the scope of the country's finances, including: (a) the right of the state to collect taxes,
issue and distribute money, and make loans; (b) the obligation of the state to perform the duties
of public services of the state government and pay the bills of third parties; (c) State revenue;
(d) State expenditures; (e) Regional Reception; (f) Regional Expenditures; (g) State
assets/regional assets that are managed by themselves or by other parties in the form of money,
securities, accounts receivable, goods, and other rights that can be valued in money, including
assets separated from state/regional companies; (h) the assets of other parties that are controlled
by the government in the context of carrying out government tasks and/or public interests; and
(i) other party's assets obtained by using facilities provided by the government. Based on these
provisions, it can be understood that state wealth include separated assets. Thus, state wealth or
separated state assets intended for the inclusion of state capital to state-owned enterprises are
still part of the state's wealth. This statement was confirmed by the Constitutional Court
Decision Number 48/PUU-XI/2013 and Decision Number 62/PUU-XI/2013 that all SOEs
assets, whether separate or inseparable, are actually state wealth.
On the other hand, Law No. 19 of 2003 on State-Owned Enterprises (“Law No.
19/2003”) define the state wealth that is separated as state wealth derived from the State Budget
(Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara/APBN) to be used as state capital investment in persero
and/or perum as well as other limited liability companies. SOEs is distinguished into 2 (two),
namely Persero and Perum. The Company or Persero is a state-owned enterprise in the form of
a limited liability company whose capital is divided into shares that are all or at least 51% (fiftyone percent) of its shares owned by the state whose main purpose is to pursue profit, while

Justin Yifu Lin, Fang Cai, dan Zhou Li, “Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-Owned Enterprise
Reform”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 2, (May, 1998), pg. 422.
48 Qian Sun, Wilson Tong, dan Jing Tong, “How Does Government Ownership Affect Firm
Performance? Evidence from China’s Privatization Experience”, Journal of Business and Accounting, 29 (1) & (2),
(January-March, 2002), pg. 22.
49 Yair Aharoni, “Performance Evaluation of State-Owned Enterprises: A Process Perspective”,
Management Science, Vol. 27, No. 11 (November, 1981), hlm, 1343.
50 Shidarta dan Van Huis, “Between Revenues and Public Services Delivery”, pg. 323.
51 W. Ridwan Tjandra, Hukum Keuangan Negara, (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2014), pg. 10.
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Perum is a state-owned enterprise whose entire capital is owned by the state and is not divided
into shares. In this paper that will be discussed is SOEs in the form of Persero.
Separated state assets as referred to in Article 4 of Law no. 19/2003 is the separation of
state assets from the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget to be used as state capital
participation in SOEs, where further development and management are no longer based on the
APBN system, but their development and management are based on good corporate
governance. Based on the explanation, state wealth that is separated into SOEs through the
inclusion of capital is no longer managed based on the APBN system, but rather managed based
on the principles of a good corporate governance.
This is reinforced by the issuance of the Supreme Court Fatwa Number
WKMA/YUD/20/VIII/2006 year 2006 which one of its decisions confirms that the
development and management of state-owned enterprises' capital derived from state wealth is
not based on the APBN system, but rather is based on the principles of a healthy company.52
According to the Fatwa, Law No. 17/2003 is no longer legally binding with law No. 19/2003
in which Law No. 19/2003 is lex specialis and newer than Law No. 17/2003.53
Based on Article 1 paragraph (1) of Law No. 1 of 2004 concerning State Treasury (“Law
No. 1/2004”), State Treasury is the management and accountability of state finances, including
investments and wealth that are separated, stipulated in the APBN and APBD. Furthermore, it
is stated in Law No. 1/2004 that the Law on State Budget is the basis for the Central
Government to conduct state revenues and expenditures and the Regional Regulation on APBD
is the basis for local governments to conduct regional revenues and expenditures. Based on
these matters, it is known that the scope of the state treasury is limited only to those stipulated
in the APBN and/or APBD.
Law No.1/2004 stipulates the Minister of Finance as the State General Treasurer, who
has anumber of other authorities as follows: (i) break the budget implementation document; (ii)
conduct control over the implementation of the APBN; and iii) invest state money and
manage/manage investments.
Once the country's wealth/finances are separated and become the wealth/finances of
the legal entity that receives then all its rights and obligations will no longer be the obligations
of the state. Concrete legal evidence of state wealth/finance being separated is no longer the
state's wealth/finances are:54
1) The deposit of the money no longer goes to the state treasury as a place of storage of state
money determined by the minister of finance as the general treasurer of the state, whereas
in principle all receipts must be immediately deposited into the state treasury and all
expenditures come from the state treasury;
2) The rights and obligations that arise over the separated state assets/finances no longer make
the APBN law the basis for revenues (rights) and expenditures (obligations);
3) The Minister of Finance as the general treasurer of the state has no authority over the
finances that have been separated except in his position as a representative of the state as a
shareholder whose legal position is the same as other shareholders according to the
Company Law; and
Supreme Court, Fatwa Number WKMA/YUD/20/VIII/2006 of 2006, 16 August 2006.
“That in the above articles, which is a special law on SOEs, it is clearly said that the capital of SOEs
comes from state assets that have been separated from the APBN and subsequently the development and
management is not based on the state APBN but rather based on the principles of a healthy company”, See
Supreme Court, Fatwa Number WKMA/YUD/20/VIII/2006.
54 Dian Puji Simatupang, Paradoks Rasionalitas Perluasan Ruang Lingkup Keuangan Negara dan Implikasinya
Terhadap Kinerja Keuangan Pemerintah, (Jakarta: Badan Penerbit FHUI, 2011), pg. 128.
52
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4) Liability for claims and / or risks arising on separated state assets / finances does not
become a burden on the APBN and does not appear in the budget execution form (DIPA),
which is a budget execution document.
Based on Government Regulation No. 41 of 2003 concerning The Delegation of
Positions, Duties and Authorities of the Minister of Finance in The Company (Persero), Public
Companies (Perum) and Office Companies (Perjan) to the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises
(“GR No. 41/2003”), The position, duties and authority of the Minister of Finance in the field
of development and supervision of SOEs are partially delegated to the Ministry of SOEs, namely
those who represent the Government as shareholders or the General Meeting of Shareholders
(GMS) in Persero or state-owned limited liability companies directly. The act of delegation
according to the State Administrative Law is the delegation of government authority from one
organ of government to another.55 The legal consequence of the delegation is the transfer of
responsibility from the delegator to the delegation government.56 Delegation of this authority
means that the Ministry of Finance as the supervisor and supervisor of SOEs has delegated the
authority and its responsibilities to the Ministry of SOEs.
In connection with the supervision and administration of state-owned assets embedded
in SOEs and limited liability companies, including the addition and reduction of state wealth
investment and changes in the state ownership structure as a result of the transfer of stateowned shares or issuance of new shares not taken part by the state, it is necessary to be stipulated
by a Government Regulation.
Based on the searches that have been conducted, tata way of participation and
administration of state capital in the framework of the establishment or participation into SOEs
and/or limited liability companies whose shares are partly owned by the state at least related to
3 (three) relevant Government Regulations, namely:
1) Republic of Indonesia Government Regulation No. 43 of 2005 concerning Merger,
Consolidation, Acquisition, and Change in the Form of Legal Entities for State-Owned
Enterprises (“GR No. 43/2005”);
Based on Article 5 GR No. 43/2005, Merger, Consolidation and Acquisition of SOEs
which require a Government Regulation:
(i) Merger between Perum and other Perum, or Persero with other Persero;
(ii) Consolidation between Perum and other Perum, or Persero with other Persero; or
(iii) Takeovers made by Perum against Persero, Perum against limited liability companies,
Persero against other Persero, or Persero against limited liability companies.
Elucidation of Article 4 GR No. 43/2005 confirms that GR No. 43/2005 does not regulate
Mergers, Consolidations and Acquisitions between SOEs and companies other than SOEs.
However, if this happens and causes a change in the amount and composition and
investment of state capital, it must be stipulated by a Government Regulation. The
consequence of the above regulation is GR No. 43/2005 does not prevail to transactions
at the SOE subsidiary level.
Based on GR No. 43/2005, the process of Merger, Consolidation and Acquisition of SOEs
is carried out by proposing transactions made by the Minister appointed as the GMS (in
this case generally the Minister of SOEs) to the President accompanied by the basis for
consideration after joint review with the Minister of Finance. The k ajian may include the

55
56

Ridwan HR, Hukum Administrasi Negara, (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2016), pg. 90.
Ibid, pg. 105.
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technical minister and/or use an independent consultant.57 In the final stage, the SOE
takeover is carried out by the Minister of SOEs after the issuance of a government
regulation regarding the takeover of the SOEs concerned.
Thus, it is known that for Merger, Consolidation and Acquisition transactions of SOES
must be conducted a review in advance by the Minister of SOEs and the Ministry of Finance
and then, if approved, it will be carried out with a Government Regulation issued based on
a joint study between the Ministry of SOEs and the Ministry of Finance.
2) Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 44 of 2005 concerning
Procedures for Participation and Administration of State Capital in State-Owned
Enterprises and Limited Liability Companies as amended based on Government Regulation
of the Republic of Indonesia No. 72 of 2016 (“GR No. 44/2005”).
Based on GR No. 44/2005, any participation or addition of state capital or reduction of
state capital participation in SOEs and limited liability companies whose funds come from
the APBN shall be stipulated by a Government Regulation and implemented under the
provisions of the laws and regulations in the field of state finance.
The participation of state capital into SOEs and limited liability companies is sourced from:
a.

APBN,which covers the country's wealth in the form of: (i) fresh funds; (ii) state
property; (iii) state receivables in SOEs or limited liability companies; (iv) state-owned
shares in SOEs or limited liability companies; and/or (v) other state assets.
Any participation and addition of state capital investment derived from the APBN shall
be implemented in accordance with the provisions of the laws and regulations in the
field of state finance.
Furthermore, Article 2A GR No. 44/2005 states that the Inclusion of State Capital
derived from state assets in the form of state-owned shares in SOEs or limited liability
companies to SOEs or other limited liability companies, is carried out by the Central
Government without going through APBN mechanism. Dnature matters of stateowned assets in the form of state-owned shares in so-called SOEs are used as state
capital investments in other SOEs so that most of the shares are owned by other SOEs,
then the SOE becomes a subsidiary of SOEs with the provision of the state must have
shares with privileges stipulated in the articles of association.
Based on the provisions of GR No. 44/2005, the addition of state capital participation
based on the APBN can be done on the proposal of the Minister of Finance to the
President accompanied by a rationale based on the results of a joint review with the
Minister of SOEs and/or the Minister of Technical. Furthermore, theimplementation
of the addition is carried out by the Minister of SOEs and the Minister of Finance after
the issuance of government regulations.

b. Reserved capitalization and/or other sources.

57 Elucidation of Article 9 GR No. 43/2005 explaining that the considerations presented by the Minister
to the President include an explanation of the settlement of creditors' objections to the merger, merger and takeover
plans of SOEs, if any. A joint review with the Minister of Finance is carried out considering that such actions may
result in changes to the structure of state capital investment. While the involvement of the Minister of Technical
and/or other ministers and / or leaders of other agencies in connection with sectoral policies in the field ofstateowned enterprises, public service obligation, and because of the legislation.
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Additional state equity participation based on the capitalization of reserves and/or
other sources above is determined by the resolution of the GMS for Persero and
Limited Liability Companies and the Ministerial Decree for Perum.
In addition to state capital participation in SOEs, a reduction in State capital
participation can be carried out if it is proposed by the Ministry of Finance to the
President accompanied by basic considerations after joint review with the Minister of
SOEs.
The reduction of state capital participation in SOEs and limited liability companies is
carried out in the framework of: (i) Sale of State-owned shares in Persero and Limited
Liability Companies; (ii) Transfer of SOEs assets for state capital participation in other
SOEs or Limited Liability Companies, the establishment of new SOEs, or become
inseparable state assets; (iii) Separation of SOEs subsidiaries into SOEs; and/or (iv)
Corporate restructuring.
According to Article 22 GR No. 44/2005, any reduction in state equity participation in
SOEs and Limited Liability Companies is determined by the GMS by following the
corporate mechanism, so there is no need to wait/depend on the issuance of a
Government Regulation. Nevertheless, Government Regulation is still published in the
framework of the administrative order of the Administration of State Capital
Investment. Furthermore, based on Article 25 GR No. 44/2005, the implementation
of state capital participation and reduction of state capital participation shall be reported
by the Minister to the Minister of Finance for administration.
3) Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 45 of 2005 concerning the
Establishment, Management, Supervision, and Dissolution of State-Owned Enterprises
(“GR No. 45/2005”).
Establishment of SOEs according to GR No. 45/2005, including:
(i) establishment of a new Perum or Persero that is not originated from the transfer of
form and smelting as referred to in letters b, c, and d below;
(ii) change in the form of government agency units into SOEs;
(iii) changes in the form of SOEs; atau
(iv) the formation of SOEs as a result of the merger of Persero and Perum.
Based on GR No. 45/2005, the establishment of SOEs must be stipulated by a government
regulation that at least contains: establishment of SOEs; the aims and objectives of
establishing SOEs; and determination of the amount of the separated state assets.
C. Improving the Role of Entities of the Ministry of SOEs in the Development,
Management and Supervision of SOEs
With the development of SOEs in other countries across the world, the problem of
ensuring that these companies are managed appropriately is a major concern of many
governments.58 Based on research conducted by the Institution for Development Sector, SOEs in
developing countries are experiencing some major problems that can generally be classified in
general, namely in the fields of politics, finance, management and regulation.59 It can be said
58 Raymond Vernon, “Linking Managers with Ministers: Dilemmas of the State-Owned Enterprise”,
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 4, No. 1, (1984), pg. 40.
59 Enrique Moreno de Acevedo Sánchez, “State Owned Enterprise Management: Advantage of
Centralized Modals,” pg. 9.
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that the Ministry of SOEs is still experiencing obstacles in realizing the competitiveness of SOEs
due to inadequate management and regulations that limit SOEs to gain profits.
Law No. 19/2003 mandates that one of the goals of SOEs is to gain profit (profit
oriented) and its management is based on the principles of good corporate governance.
However, in carrying out its business activities, SOEs can be bound by a variety of provisions
of legislation that are much more numerous compared to the private sector.

Diagram 1
Laws applicable to SOEs
State Wealth Law

State Treasury Law

Capital Market Law

Corruption Law

State Financial
Management &
Accountability
Audit Law

Sectoral/Bussiness
Activity Law

SOEs Law

BPK UU

SOEs
Company Law

Job Creation Law

Diagram 2
Laws that apply to the private sector
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Sectoral/Bussiness
Activity Law

Capital Market
Law

Company Law

Job Creation Law

Private

The binding of SOEs with various laws and regulations provides the risk of overlap,
conflict, and multi-interpretation in the management of SOEs. This condition has the potential
to cause distortion in law enforcement if there is a case.60 For example, the difference
ininterpretation of the scope of the state in the SOEs Law with other related laws and
regulations, such as the State Wealth Law. Even though the elucidation of Article 4 of Law no.
19/2003 has stated clearly that SOEs finances are not subject to the APBN and are separated
state assets, however, the scope of state wealth in Article 2 letter g of Law no. 17/2003 states
that state assets are separated as part of state finances.
In carrying out its business activities SOEs is subject to the financial obligations of the
state. Thus, the state as a shareholder has the responsibility to bear the risks that occur in all
spheres of state finances. In fact, it should not be the responsibility of the state or at least not
related to the purpose of the state. These differences cause conflicts of law and inconsistencies
in their management and examination.61 For example in policy making by the Board of Directors
of SOEs aimed at business interests and in fact impacting on the losses of SOEs, it is vulnerable
to corruption cases.62 The position of SOEs that tend to be vulnerable to corruption cases and

Kukuh Komandoko, “The Distortion on Law Enforcement in The Financial Services Sector (The Case
of Dana Pensiun Pupuk Kalimantan Timur,” (Prosiding Konferensi Nasional Hukum Pidana 2019, Telaah Kritis
Kebijakan dan Penegakan Hukum Pidana Terhadap Pelaku Pidana di Bidang Perekonomian, Palembang, 30-31
October 2019), pg. 5 – 6.
61 Simatupang, Paradoks…, pg. 4.
62 Isis Ikhwansyah, An-an Chandrawulan dan Prita Amalia, “Optimalisasi Peran Badan Usaha Milik
Negara (BUMN) pada Era Masyarakat Ekonomi Asean (MEA)”, Jurnal Media Hukum, Vol. 25, No. 25, (Desember,
2018), pg. 152.
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compliance with the Tipikor Law, it is partly due to:63 (i) close relations between SOEs and the
government, politicians, SOEs administrators and senior management; (ii) poor governance and
management of SOEs; (iii) conflicts of interest in SOEs; and (iv) lack of accountability through
transparency and public reporting of SOEs.
In relation to SOEs in the form of Persero, then as stated in Article 11 of Law No.
19/2003, the SOE is subject to the provisions and principles stipulated in Law No. 40 of 2007
concerning Limited Liability Companies (“Law No. 40/2007”). A limited liability company is a
legal entity that has legal rights and obligations and is separate from its owners (shareholders).
A Limited Liability Company has assets separate from the assets of the Board of Directors (as
manager), Commissioner (as supervisor), and Shareholders (as owner).64 Shareholders have
limitedliability, only limited to the shares they own. This is stated in Article 3 of Law No.
40/2007, the Company's shareholders are not personally responsible for the alliance made on
behalf of the Company and are not responsible for losses of the Company beyond the shares
owned or known as the principle of shareholder liability (piercing the corporate veil).
As a limited liability company, Organ Persero consists of a General Meeting of
Shareholders (“GMS”), Board of Directors, and Board of Commissioners. Minister (i.e. Minister
of SOEs) act as the GMS that holds the highest power in Persero and holds all authority that is
not handed over to the Board of Directors or Commissioners. Based on the elucidation of
Article 14 of Law no. 19/2003, matters that require prior approval from the Minister of SOEs
because of its strategic nature for the sustainability of the Company, are as follows:
1) changes in the amount of capital;
2) amendments to the articles of association;
3) use of proceeds plan;
4) merger, consolidation, takeover, separation and dissolution of the Persero;
5) investment and long-term financing;
6) cooperation of Persero;
7) the establishment of a subsidiary or investment;
8) transfer of assets.
As a GMS, the Ministry of SOEs can take strategic policies for the development of
SOEs. However, the Ministry of SOEs does not supervise the daily operations of SOEs because
the Minister of SOEs as GMS has appointed credible directors and commissioners and
entrusted the operations of SOEs to them.
Based on the principles of Article 4 of Law No. 19/2003, the development and
management of SOEs is based on the principles of good corporate governance (GCG). GCG is the
basis of the market economy system. This is because the implementation of GCG will support
and create a good business environment so as to increase competitive advantage and avoid
corruptive behavior.65 The performance of SOEs management has not been optimal, one of
which is also due to the not yet implemented GCG principles in SOEs. In fact, the obligation
to implement GCG on SOEs has been mandated in the Regulation of the Minister of StateOwned Enterprises Number PER-01/MBU/2011 of 2011 concerning the Implementation
Peter Wilkinson, “10 Anti-corruption Principles for State-Owned Enterprises”, Transparency
International, 2017, hlm 03.
64 Erman Rajaguguk, “BUMN Persero Sebagai Badan Hukum, Pengertian Keuangan Negara Dan
Kerugian Negara: Lahirnya PP 33 Tahun 2006 dan Implikasinya bagi Pemberantasan Korupsi”, dalam Badan Usaha
Milik Negara dalam Bentuk Perseroan Terbatas, (2016), pg. 30.
65 Akhsanul Khaq, Dermawan Syahrial, dan Wilhelmus Hary Susilo, “An Increased on Firm Value: Insight
in State Owned Enterprises that Listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 2013-2018”, International Journal of
Economics and Financial Issues, 10(2), (2020), pg. 143.
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ofGood Corporate Governance in State-Owned Enterprises.66 There are several benefits obtained in
the implementation of GCG, namely:67 i) easy access to foreign and domestic investment; ii) cost
of capital obtained is cheaper; iii) provide better decisions in improving the company's economic
performance; iv) increase the confidence and trust of shareholders and stakeholders in the
company; dan v) melindungi Board of Directors/Commissioners/Board of Executives from
lawsuits. In addition, GCG involving the Board of Directors, Board of Commissioners and
GMS provides added value to shareholders on an ongoing basis in the long term, while paying
attention to the interests of other stakeholders, based on prevailing laws and regulations and
norms.
The Minister of SOEs as GMS still has certain limitations in performing itsduties, as
described in GR No. 43/2005, GR No. 44/2005, and GR No. 45/2005 above, namely misalnya
for the establishment of SOEs, or the participation of state-owned enterprises must be through
the permission of the Minister of Finance and implemented after the issuance of Government
Regulations. For the merger, consolidation, and takeover of SOEs, the Ministry of SOEs must
first submit a proposal to the President along with the basis for consideration after joint review
with the Minister of Finance. This merger, consolidation, and takeover of SOEs are carried out
by the State Minister for SOEs after the issuance of a Government Regulation regarding the
merger, consolidation, and takeover of the SOEs concerned. In addition, in order to privatize
SOEs, there must be approval from the House of Representatives on the draft of APBN in
which there is a target of state revenue from the privatization results.
Based on GR No. 41/2003, the delegation of the position, duties, and authority of the
Minister of Finance to the Ministry of SOEs does not include:
1) Administration of each state capital investment following its changes into Persero/Limited
Liability Company;
2) Proposal for each state capital participation into Persero/Limited Liability Company;
3) Establishment of Persero.
Exceptions for the transfer of authority, especially in points 1 and 2 above, can create
obstacles for business activities to be carried out by SOEs. For example, if the SOEs plans to
merge with other SOEs and does not use additional state capital participation from the APBN
and does not change the total percentage of state ownership in the company resulting from the
merger, it is still obliges to go through the procedure stipulated in GR No. 44/2016, namely a
study with the Minister of Finance and issuance of Government Regulations. Another example,
when the Ministry of Finance decides that certain projects led by SOEs have the potential to
jeopardize the government's fiscal position, the Ministry of Finance will intervene and press to
review those projects.68 This happened when the Ministry of Finance tried to control the
timeframe and terms of state-owned development projects such as the 35,000 MW electricity
program and the Jabodetabek Light Rail Transit project.69 Such obligations may impede the
state-owned enterprises' plans to take corporate action that has been reviewed from a business
point of view. Therefore, if the corporate action does not require the inclusion of additional
"SOEs must implement GCG consistently and sustainably based on this Ministerial Regulation while
paying attention to the prevailing provisions, and norms and articles of association of SOEs”, See Minister of
SOEs, Ministerial Regulation No. PER-01/MBU/2011, Art 2.
67 Bacelius Ruru in his paper presented at the coordination meeting of SOEs in Akmaluddin Hasibuan,
"Transformasi Budaya Perusahaan di BUMN melalui Pelaksanaan Good Corporate Governance", Makalah dalam
Seminar of Corporate Governance 2003, (Bali: 23-24 January 2003).
68 Kyunghoon Kim, “Indonesia’s Restrained State Capitalism: Development and Policy Challenges”,
Journal of Contemporary Asia, (2019), pg. 21.
69 Ibid.
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state capital derived from the APBN, it should be sufficient approval obligation on Ministry of
SOEs as GMS like a private company. Furthermore, considering that the Ministry of SOEs is
the supervisor and supervisor of SOEs and who knows best about the needs of SOEs, the
Ministry of SOEs can be given the authority to make proposals for state capital participation in
SOEs. If the Government wants state objectives and efficient management of SOEs to be
achieved, then the relationship between SOEs and the state must be repaired or even
improved.70 This increase or improvement can be implemented through more centralized
supervision of SOEs, namely through the Ministry of SOEs.
If we observe at the reform of the development of SOEs in China, some things that can
be considered in increasing the role of SOEs, including the following: (i) reducing government
intervention, where excessive government control and intervention on SOEs can lead to low
efficiency, SOEs are expected to have substantial freedom in decision making and operations
in the market; ii) supervision of professional performance and employees of SOEs, where
professionals are required to have good management and responsibility for the progress of
SOEs, while workers who are not professional can be stopped at any time; iii) pay attention to
the need for government investment in SOEs, including by making SOEs efficiency in the
ownership structure either through privatization, joint ventures, or even private companies, if
needed.71
Regarding its role in developing, managing, and even supervising SOEs, the Ministry of
SOEs should be given broader authority to manage SOEs finances which are separated state
assets. The authority in question is a measurable authority and focuses on the establishment of
a competitive corporate system. This authority can be given by providing clear boundaries that
the Minister of SOEs as the GMS can make decisions regarding corporate actions such as
mergers, acquisitions and consolidations, privatization, or asset management such as write-offs
or asset transfers without further permission from the Ministry of Finance and the President as
far as the corporate action does not originate or require funds from the APBN.
Characteristics of SOEs that have many objectives and sometimes conflicting,strong
political intervention, and lack of transparency cause SOEs to have complicated governance
compared to the private sector. The development of SOEs should put forward 3 main
principles, namely: (i) clear objectives, where there is a clear mandate for the managers of SOEs so
that they are only responsible for one door; (ii) transparency, where the principle of high disclosure
is applied to both the government and SOEs; dan (iii) political insulation, where government duties
are limited as supervisors and directors, while management is carried out by professionals
independently, so that governance can be carried out properly.72 As with the private sector, SOEs
performance is required to be professional. As an economic actor, basically, SOEs are no
different from the private sector. Only the owner is mostly by the state. However, the
precautionary principles must always be prioritized in such professionalism because many
conditions affect the performance of SOEs which differentiates it from the private sector.
Therefore, SOEs must be subject to more laws and regulations compared to private.73
Institutionally, SOEs have more potential interventions from stakeholders and regulations
attached to them than private sector.
Jean-Pierre Anastassopoulos, “State-Owned Enterprises between Autonomy and Dependency”, Journal
of Public Policy, Vol. 5, No. 4, (October, 1985), pg. 522.
71 Xiaolu Wang, “State-Owned Enterprise in China: has it been effective?”, (ANU Press, 2002, pg. 39-42.
72 Material Test Review on Law No. 17 of 2003 concerning State Finances on Article 23 paragraph (1)
requested by CSSUI at the Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia Number 48/PUUXI/2013 dated September 18, 2014.
73 Christian Orchard, “Penerapan Good Corporate Governance dalam Upaya Mewujudkan BUMN yang
berbudaya”, Jurnal Hukum Samudera Keadilan, 2016, pg. 259-271.
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Nevertheless, if reviewed from the characteristics and principles of SOEs as outlined
above, it will not be separated from the intervention of the Ministry of SOEs, especially in the
implementation of its duties and functions, including:74
1) formulating and stipulating policies in the fields of business development, strategic business
initiatives, strengthening competitiveness and synergy, strengthening performance, creating
sustainable growth, restructuring, managing laws and regulations, human resource
management, technology and information, finance and corporate risk management state
owned enterprises;
2) management of state property/wealth that is the responsibility of the Ministry of SOEs;
and
3) supervision over the implementation of tasks within the Ministry of SOEs.
From a positive axiological perspective, some of the duties and functions of the Ministry
of SOEs as mentioned above are very central and significant when talking about corporate
business processes that are competitive, dynamic, profit oriented and public services. The duties
and functions of the Ministry of SOEs as stipulated in Presidential Regulation No. 81 Tahun
2019 concerning the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises (“PR No. 81/2019”) must be
understood as a norm that provides a basis for providing bigger and more measurable space to
the Ministry of SOEs in managing state property / assets which are its responsibility.
The provision of greater and measurable space can also be given in accordance with the
corridors of national economic spirit organized based on economic democracy with the
principle of togetherness, fair efficiency, sustainable, environmentally sound, self-reliance, and
by maintaining a balance of progress and national economic unity.75
Teleologically, giving the Ministry of SOEs a bigger and more measured space is
intended to increase efficiency for the sake of progress and national economic unity. From an
ideal and simpler perspective, it can be said that increasing the role of the Ministry of SOEs will
increase the capacity of SOEs to become more totally professional.
III. CONCLUSION
To create totally professional SOEs, it will not be separated from the improvement of
guidance, management and supervision carried out by the Ministry of SOEs. The Ministry of
SOEs needs to improve its role with measurable powers in administering state capital
participation, along with the entire structure of corporate action against SOEs. The structure of
corporate action is included in privatization, merger, acquisition, consolidation and other
corporate actions related to capitalization.
In accordance with its duties and functions, the Ministry of SOEs as the shareholders
of SOEs can take strategic policies for the advancement of SOEs. In carrying out the
administration of SOEs, if the funds used come from the APBN, then approval must be done
by the Minister of Finance as the State Treasurer. As for the administration of state capital
investment derived from outside the APBN is handed over its authority to the Ministry of
SOEs.
Nevertheless, theMinistry of Finance as the state treasurer remains authorized in the
fiscal and administrative functions of state wealth. The position, duties and authority of the
Minister of Finance delegated to the Minister of SOEs is the party who represents the
Government as the shareholder or the General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS) of Persero and
Article 5 letter a., letter d., and letter e., Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number
81 of 2019 concerning the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises.
75 Article 33 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution.
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Limited Liability Companies whose shares are partly owned by the Republic of Indonesia.
Ontologically, the Ministry of Finance is still authorized to conductbusiness efforts for each
state capital investment directly derived from the APBN.
Related to the increasing role of the Ministry of SOEs, it is necessary to affirm
epistimologically the scope of State Wealth. Especially regarding the state wealth that is the
responsibility of the Ministry of SOEs, so that it can be managed autonomously by the Ministry
of SOEs. This is necessary to provide greater but measurable space to the Ministry of SOEs in
order to act like a corporate shareholder. In addition, this will also reduce the burden on SOEs
from legal limitations, so that they can be more productive and compete with private companies.
From axiological perspective, it is possible to increase the role of the Ministry of SOEs,
as long as it is carried out within the corridor of implementation and fundamentals of Article 33
of the 1945 Constitution. While reviewed normatively, the duties and functions of the Ministry
of SOEs as stipulated in Presidential Regulation No. 81/2019 should be understood as a caucus
to provide greater and measurable space in the management of state property/wealth that is the
responsibility of the Ministry of SOEs.
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